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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Timothy Haas appeals from the district court's denial of his third 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Haas guilty of sexual battery of a minor child. (R., pp. 70-72.) 
The district court sentenced Haas to a unified 25-year sentence with nine years 
fixed. (R., p. 71.) Haas filed an Inmate Request form expressing his desire to 
appeal, and requesting assistance to do so. (R., p. 107.) Although this was 
forwarded to the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, no appeal was filed. 
(R., p. 108.) Thereafter, Haas filed a Rule 35 motion, and later a (first) petition 
for post-conviction relief; the same counsel was appointed to represent Haas in 
both matters. (R., p. 108.) 
The parties filed a stipulation in settlement of post-conviction relief, which 
included an agreement that Haas' Rule 35 motion would be determined on its 
merits following a hearing. (R., p. 108.) Based on the stipulation, the district 
court entered a conditional order dismissing Haas' post-conviction matter. 1 (R., 
p. 108.) Following the hearing on Haas' Rule 35 motion, the district court 
amended Haas' sentence to a unified term of 25 years with seven years fixed. 
(R., p. 109.) 
1 The conditional order indicated that a final order dismissing Haas' first petition 
would be entered upon entry of the court's decision on Haas' Rule 35 motion. 
(R., pp. 108-09.) However, no final order was filed. (R., p. 109.) 
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Haas filed a second petition for post-conviction relief seven years later, 
asserting two claims: (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because no appeal was filed on his behalf despite his timely request; and (2) that 
he was entitled to relief under two Idaho Supreme Court cases decided since his 
first post-conviction petition. (R., pp. 107, 113.) Counsel from Haas' first petition 
and Rule 35 motion was reappointed to represent him. (R., p. 109.) The district 
court conducted an evidentiary hearing and accepted additional briefing. (R., p. 
110.) Thereafter, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order 
dismissing the petition. (R., pp. 107-19.) 
In its order of dismissal, the district court addressed I. C. § 19-4908, which 
bars successive petitions absent a sufficient reason for adequately asserting 
claims in the original petition. (R., pp. 113, 119.) The district court found that 
Haas failed to demonstrate why his claims were inadequately raised in his first 
petition. (R., p. 119.) Noting that Haas stipulated to dismiss his first post-
conviction petition, the district court also seemed to find that Haas waived his 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal, to the extent such claim 
was raised therein. (R., pp.114-16.) In addition, the district court found that the 
cases relied on by Haas in his second post-conviction petition, which were 
decided after Haas was sentenced, did not apply retroactively or were otherwise 
inapplicable. (R., pp.117-119.) Haas did not appeal. 
Fifteen months later, Haas filed his third petition for post-conviction relief 
pro se. (R., pp. 4-14.) The petition asserted ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims concerning counsel's performances at trial, in failing to appeal, and in 
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relation to Haas' Rule 35 motion and initial post-conviction petition. (R., p. 5.) 
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely, and 
gave Haas 40 days to respond. (R., pp. 64-68.) Haas responded, arguing that 
there is no time limitation for successive petitions, and that his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims must be heard on their merits under Martinez v. 
Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (R., pp. 74-76.) The state replied, asserting the 
petition should be dismissed as barred under I.C. § 19-4908, and as res judicata. 
(R., pp. 77-78.) In a sur-reply, Haas again cited Martinez and attacked the 
state's reply as inadequate. (R., pp. 92-94.) 
The district court entered an order dismissing Haas' third petition because 
Haas failed to provide a sufficient reason justifying a successive petition under 
I.C. § 19-4908, and entered a separate judgment. (R., pp. 97-101, 126.) Haas 
timely appealed. (R., pp. 121-26.) 
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ISSUES 
Haas states the issues on appeal as: 
(1) The appellant was denied effective counsel at trial, appeals 
and post-conviction under US Supreme Court Martinez v 
Ryan 6th Amendment Claims 
(2) Did counsel forgo post-conviction to reduce sentence which 
was not reduced knowing the commission would not release 
Appellant upon completion of his fix sentence? 5th and 6th 
Amendment claims. 
(3) Trial counsel failed to file a timely appeal when instructed to 
and court records show's petitioner informed his counsel to 
file a timely appeal 
(4) Trial counsel was told by petitioner to take plea agreement 
and failed to take it, saying "We'll win this case?" And 
counsel guaranteed he'd win to "sit down and shut up." 6th 
Amend. 
(5) Court went beyond recommended sentence by prosecutor 
and the court gave appellant a very harsh sentence given 
the victim was almost 18 years old, which is cruel and 
unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 2 (verbatim).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Haas failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Haas' third petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Haas Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
Haas' Third Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Haas' third petition for post-conviction relief claimed ineffective assistance 
by trial counsel, for (1) proceeding to trial rather than pursuing a plea agreement, 
and (2) failing to appeal after trial. (R., p. 5.) Haas also claimed ineffective 
assistance by counsel for his Rule 35 motion and first post-conviction petition for 
settling his first post-conviction petition case without achieving a further reduction 
in his sentence. (R., p. 5.) The district court dismissed Haas' petition, 
concluding that Haas failed to explain "why his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel were inadequately raised in either of his earlier petitions." (R., p. 100.) 
Haas does not address the district court's basis for its dismissal. Instead, Haas 
argues the substance of his third petition's underlying claims and adds an 
additional claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 7-12; see R., p. 5.) 
Haas has failed to challenge the basis for the district court's dismissal, to 
show that consideration of his new claim is warranted, or to justify his 15-month 
delay in filing his third petition. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district 
court's order summarily dismissing the petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
5 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
"Where the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the 
trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing." 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2008) (citations 
omitted). 
C. Haas Failed To Demonstrate Sufficient Reason Why He Did Not Assert 
Or Inadequately Raised His Third Petition's Claims In Prior Petitions 
The district court dismissed Haas' third petition as an improper successive 
petition because Haas failed to provide sufficient reason for failing to assert his 
claims previously. (R., pp. 97-101.) All grounds for relief must be raised in a 
petitioner's "original, supplemental or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. 
"Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived ... may not be the basis for a subsequent application" unless 
the district court finds sufficient reason why the claim "was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. 
§ 19-4908. Haas was on notice of this ground for dismissal in the state's reply. 
(R., p. 78.) However, Haas did not address I.C. § 19-4908, either in his sur-reply 
to the district court, or in his brief on this appeal. (R., pp. 92-94; see generally 
Appellant's brief.) 
The record does not support that Haas had a sufficient reason for not 
asserting - or inadequately raising - his third post-conviction petition's claims in 
his prior petitions. The record shows Haas raised, or attempted to raise, his 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal, in his first and second 
petitions for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 113-16.) In its order dismissing Haas' 
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second petition, the district court found that Haas had settled the claim (raised in 
his initial petition) "in exchange for certain conditions associated with [his] I.C.R. 
35 motion, which the court agreed to dismiss. (R., p. 116.) Haas did not 
challenge the district court's determination that counsel's failure to appeal his 
underlying criminal matter "was settled." (R., pp. 108-09, 116.) Upon re-
asserting the issue in his third petition, Haas offered no explanation why it was 
inadequately raised before. (See R., pp. 74-76, 92-94.) 
It does not appear from the record that Haas' prior post-conviction 
petitions included claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel for not 
pursuing a plea agreement, or ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel 
for settling his initial post-conviction petition. (See R., pp. 107-10.) Haas asserts 
no reason why he failed to raise those claims - adequately or not - in his prior 
petitions. (See Appellant's brief.) Despite that the district court based its 
dismissal of Haas' successive petition on I.C § 19-4908, Haas did not address 
the provision at all. Rather, Haas argued that dismissal would be improper under 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (R., pp. 74-76, 92-94.) 
On appeal, Haas again fails to address I.C. § 19-4908. Instead, he again 
cites Martinez. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 3-7.) Haas' reliance on Martinez is 
misplaced. The Court in Martinez held that a federal habeas court may excuse 
the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim where 
post-conviction counsel was ineffective in pursuing the claim in state post-
conviction proceedings. kl at 1320. Haas' matter is not now before a federal 
habeas court, thus Martinez does not apply. Also, and significantly, Haas did not 
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allege specific facts or arguments that he received ineffective assistance by 
counsel for his second petition. (R., pp. 75-76, 92-94.) 
In Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
Court held that under I. C. § 19-4908, a claim of ineffective assistance by post-
conviction counsel, "if true, provides sufficient reason for permitting newly 
asserted allegations" as well as claims inadequately raised in the prior post-
conviction petition. kl at 798, 992 P.2d at 793 (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 
Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981 )). Hernandez identified specific facts that his 
post-conviction counsel knew and should have raised, but did not, and which he 
claimed resulted in the summary dismissal of his prior petition. Hernandez, 133 
Idaho at 798-99, 992 P.2d at 793-94. In other words, Hernandez "alleged facts 
which, if proven, would constitute sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for the 
allowance of a successive application." kl at 799, 992 P.2d at 794. Haas did 
not. (R., pp. 74-76, 92-94.) 
Haas argued he received ineffective assistance by trial counsel for 
proceeding to trial and not pursuing a plea agreement, then not pursuing an 
appeal. (R, pp. 75, 93.) Haas also argued he received ineffective assistance by 
counsel for his Rule 35 motion by failing to get the indeterminate part of his 
sentence reduced, thus foregoing his first petition. (R., pp. 75, 93.). However, 
Haas did not argue or allege facts to support a claim that he received ineffective 
assistance by counsel for his second post-conviction petition. Accordingly, Haas 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a sufficient reason to avoid dismissal 
under I.C. § 19-4908. 
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D. Haas Failed To Preserve A Claim That His Sentence Was Excessive 
With respect to Haas' contention on appeal that the district court imposed 
an excessive sentence, this claim was never raised to the district court, and 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 11.) 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 376, 384 (2005). Moreover, such a 
claim is not the proper subject of a post-conviction petition, but is a claim that 
must be raised on direct appeal. I.C. § 19-4901 (b). Although the state 
recognizes that Haas has asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
file an appeal, only that claim may be properly adjudicated in post-conviction, not 
the substantive claim Haas would have raised on appeal if an appeal had been 
filed. 
E. Even If Haas Could Overcome The Successive Petition Bar In I.C. § 19-
4908, His Second Successive Petition Is Untimely 
Even if Haas had asserted a sufficient reason to overcome the bar to 
successive petitions under I.C. § 19-4908, his petition should nevertheless be 
deemed untimely under the circumstances. 2 The Idaho Supreme Court 
discussed a "reasonable time standard" for a successive petition under I. C. § 19-
4908, in Charboneau, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870. In that case, the Court 
2 Although the district court ultimately dismissed Haas' third post-conviction 
petition for failure to allege sufficient grounds for relief, it had initially provided 
notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely. (R., pp. 64-68.) Thus, Haas 
had notice and an opportunity to respond and establish why his petition should 
be deemed timely; Haas' only response was that there is no time limit for filing 
successive petitions (R., pp. 74-76), an argument that ignores I.C. § 19-4908, 
and is therefore contrary to law. 
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held, "there should be a reasonable time within which [claims based on newly 
discovered evidence] are asserted in a successive post-conviction petition, once 
those claims are known." .!.ft at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. "In determining what a 
reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider it on a 
case-by-case basis." .!.ft The Charboneau Court found that the delay of 13 
months after Charboneau's awareness of new evidence, and before filing his 
successive petition, was "simply too long a period of time to be reasonable." .!.ft 
The Court of Appeals addressed the reasonableness of a year-long delay 
in filing a successive petition, in Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 
(Ct. App. 2008). In that case, the Court agreed with the holding in Charboneau 
that, determining the reasonable time for filing a successive petition is 
considered "on a case-by-case basis." .!.ft at 190, 177 P.3d at 404. In Schwartz, 
the Court found that the almost-12 months that Schwartz waited after being 
denied an extension to file a post-conviction petition, until she filed her petition 
alleging ineffective assistance, was too long . .!.ft at 191, 177 P.3d at 403. 
Haas' second petition was dismissed on April 18, 2011, following 
evidentiary proceedings regarding the district court's jurisdiction to consider the 
petition. (R., pp. 107-19.) If Haas had any issues that were not raised, or 
inadequately raised, by counsel in his second petition, he was on notice of such 
deficiencies as of that date. Haas does not contend otherwise. Nonetheless, 
Haas did not file his third petition for post-conviction relief until 15 months later, 
on July 18, 2012. (R., p. 4.) 
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in light of Charboneau and Schwartz, Haas' delay of 15 months before 
filing his third petition is unreasonable. Haas has provided no reason why he did 
not file his third petition, or adequately assert the third petition's claims earlier. 
Accordingly, Haas has failed to show his petition was timely. This Court must 
therefore affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing Haas' petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order dismissing Haas' third petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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